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The 21st century, otherwise unremarkable after the Great Climate Change Scare of its early 
decades was revealed to be a hoax, is remembered for its solution to an age-old problem.  
 
Given the achievements of our ancestors and the benefits that flow from them that we enjoy 
every day, it is difficult for us to conceive the moral chaos that prevailed during most of the 
20th-21st centuries – the “era of heteronomous willing” before true autonomy was socially 
engineered as the presumptive normative foundation of all social interaction both public and 
private. This was made possible by an insight formulated in the early decades of the last 
century: that consent, the cornerstone of our system of morality, cannot be given or received. 
Once this principle was established, it was impossible not to see that every action of every 
individual and institution in society was wrong and unjust.  
 
We now know with certainty that each of us is continually being wronged, even though – given 
the limits of human cognition, especially our inability for foresee all the consequences of our 
actions – the content of these wrongs may not become evident until far in the future. It became 
clear, however, that if a reliable quantitative estimate could be made of each individual’s future 
victimization, it would be possible for everyone to draw on the value of these wrongs for the 
purpose of economic exchange. This led to the establishment of a Treasury of Injustice and a 
new metric for net worth based on the amount of undeserved harm in one’s possession, and 
the Victim Credit minted by the Treasury soon established itself as the currency of choice. In 
line with the well- established principles of the free market, this influx of capital resulted in a 
wave of economic expansion, which created more opportunities for interaction and thus also 
the ever-increasing accumulation of what economists came to call Future Expected Wrongness. 
Productivity was further enhanced by the decision to do away with the Harm Limitation Proviso 
and to calculate future harm to infinity. (The objection from the eventual heat-death of the 
universe was dismissed once it was understood that the moral universe, at least that dimension 
of it that concerns compensation, is eternal and infinite.)  
 
Obstacles were encountered, and overcome. The mid-21st century saw the appearance of 
Consent Heroes. At first, these were individuals who chose to keep their interactions with 
others to an absolute minimum and by this means to remain at least as morally pure as 
humanly possible. The great monasteries and retreats that were established for this purpose, 
organized around the principle of lifetime solitary confinement, became legendary. The 
irrationality of this movement, however, was obvious to most, since the strength of the 
economy, hence the well-being of society, depended on the unlimited accumulation of future 
injustice, which mandated that interaction be maximized rather than minimized so as to create 
as many opportunities as possible to act wrongly. Misguided efforts were made to ban the 
monasteries, but eventually the solution that prevails today was hit upon. It was realized that 
the existence of the monasteries was itself a source of future injustice, in the form of the harm 
done to society as a whole by their attempts, to some extent successful, to avoid harming 
others and thus, by lowering the sum of unjust acts, lowering productivity and wealth as we 
now measure them. 
 
In time a more extreme form of Consent Heroism emerged: suicide. The stated intention was to 
avoid harming others by the undeniably elegant expedient of ending one’s life. In reality these 
suicides (often carried out with great histrionics and widely shared on social media) were 
protests against the then-emerging moral and economic order being implemented by the 
Treasury’s Victim Credit System, and were intended as a reductio ad absurdum argument 
against the very idea that our fundamental moral obligation is to refrain from actions not 
consented to by all the affected parties. It was immediately evident, however, that suicides 
contributed to Future Estimated Wrongness even more than monastics did (since the former’s 
unjust acts dropped to absolute zero, something not even the most rigorous solitary 
confinement could achieve) and unjustly denied the Treasury much revenue, thus enabling it to 
issue Special Victim Credits based on the suicide rate (together with other measures of each 
individual suicide’s likely harm production over the course of the life the suicide would 
otherwise have led, with the consequences calculated to infinity). Now, of course, we honor 
these Consent Heroes, and it is the hope of each “family” (on this, see the Report to the 
Registrar of Consent to Human Nature, in particular its Opt-Out and Sunset Provisions) that at 
least one of its “children” choose this way of contributing to freedom and prosperity.  
 
The great conceptual breakthrough came with the realization that the principle of tacit consent, 
which had legitimated wrong-doing for so long owing to its apparent plausibility, was fatally 
flawed.  
 
Granted, even express consent has its problems. A great many conditions must be met in order 
to unambiguously give consent. First, consent must be given explicitly – in principal verbally, 
but in practice nothing less than a sworn written declaration will do. Second, consent must be 
freely given. Third, the consenter must be mentally competent to consent, i.e. not delusional or 
otherwise cognitively impaired. Fourth, consent must be informed: the prospective consenter 
must be aware, and made aware, of all of the ways the action consented to may affect him or 
her. The one seeking consent must perform due diligence by actively verifying that all these 
conditions have indeed been met, ideally by both reviewing existing documentation attesting to 
the fitness of the party affected by the proposed action and by carrying out an independent 
investigation into the matter.  
 
There is of course a practical problem here, namely that securing consent before acting is so 
time-consuming that action will rarely occur. The problem is magnified when one considers that 
all others potentially affected by the action must also give consent – a group that, it was quickly 
realized, includes everyone alive and all future generations. (The necessity of securing the 
consent of the dead continues to be hotly debated.) There is also the much-discussed imbroglio 
of infinite regress, since the act of verifying someone’s fitness to give consent must itself be 
consented to, and so on ad infinitum.  
 
Tacit consent is even more troubling than express consent. As we know, the principle of tacit 
consent was introduced by the notorious English white heterosexual male racist, sexist, and 
classist John Locke (1631-1704) precisely as a remedy for the evident fact that almost no one 
has expressly consented to be ruled by their government, which on Locke’s account means that 
no government is legitimate. His solution was to hold that merely by living in a society, one is 
implicitly or “tacitly” consenting to its government. By this criterion, however, merely going 
along with what someone is doing to one is equivalent to having given one’s permission to do 
it. “Consent” here means no more than “not strongly opposed” and perhaps not even that – an 
unacceptably fragile standard on which to rest the fundamental institutions of a society.  
 
As we know, the concept of tacit consent came to be understood differently: the idea is that 
one gives tacit consent to X’s act A by failing to express the desire that X refrain from A, in a 
context in which one would ordinarily be expected to express that desire. In other words, for 
one to express consent tacitly, the context must be such that a person’s failure to make the 
absence of a desire explicit can rightly be taken as the expression of that desire. Two conditions 
are required: (1) the person must be competent to express the desire that X refrain from A, and 
(2) the person would be expected to express the desire that X refrain from A (under the 
circumstances). Thus a woman who, after a total stranger at a party takes her hand in his, fails 
to withdraw it, and assuming there is a general expectation that women withdraw their hands 
from those of men with whom they are not familiar (or, at a minimum, do not fancy), may be 
regarded as having consented to the man’s advance.1  
 
However, tacit consent imposes unacceptable burdens. What counts as an indication of tacit 
consent depends on the context, which can vary depending on the conventions of the culture. 
A woman who leaves her hand in a man’s may be tacitly consenting to the advance, but only 
where there is an expectation that she would withdraw her hand if she were not. If the 
expectation were different, e.g. if holding hands with unknown men became normal, her 
inaction would mean nothing at all. The determination of consent thus requires a thorough 
vetting of the context, a process that in principle should be extended indefinitely because its 
outcome will never be settled once and for all – assuming, of course, that it is carried out by 
sufficiently sincere and committed casuists.  
 
For a time, it was hoped that a standard checklist would provide an efficient means to confirm 
the contextual conditions required for tacit consent in any given case, in the form of a series of 
questions put to the proposed consenter concerning his or her freedom from coercion, mental 
competence, possession of relevant information, and so forth. Of course, this defeated the 
purpose of tacit consent by transforming it into express consent, and also ran afoul of the Irony 
Limitation Act of 2023. Quite apart from this, the use of simple checklists proved inadequate for 
a sufficiently robust determination of fitness to consent. Indeed, no adequate method of 
determining fitness exists. 
 
1 With this definition and illustration I follow Haworth (2012: 124-125), who follows Sartre 
(1969: 55ff) and Simmons (1979: 79-80).  
 
Moreover, consent given tacitly can only be withdrawn explicitly. In the illustration given above, 
the woman would be required to actively and unambiguously withdraw her hand. This unfairly 
puts the burden on the potential victim of non-consensual activity. We must not attribute 
consent unless and until we have exhaustively examined the circumstances under which the 
failure to withdraw consent takes place, and determined beyond all shadow of a doubt that 
inaction is not due to incompetence, coercion, distraction, confusion, effects of past trauma, 
lack of privilege, imbalance of power, hope for a future reward, or some other heteronomous 
factor. But it is impossible to make a determination of this kind.  
 
Taking into account all these considerations, it became clear that it was impossible to give or 
receive consent whether expressly or tacitly, which meant that it was impossible for human 
beings to interact with one another in morally permissible ways. Morality demanded, therefore, 
that we criminalize everything by presuming that no one has consented to anything. 
 
Individual agency is the basic value that drives our morality. As beings with second-order as well 
as first-order beliefs and desires, we ask ourselves whether our beliefs are true and whether 
our desires are the best. In this way we commit ourselves to choice-worthy goals and plan our 
lives so as to achieve them by freely cooperating with others so disposed. We transform the 
natural world into a world of our own. But ownership of a shared world requires that we 
consent to its arrangements, for otherwise it would be we who are owned by the world. As 
consent cannot be given, our forebears succeeded in achieving our moral goals in the only way 
possible: by acknowledging that it is impossible to achieve them, conferring the status of 
currency on the harm done to those victimized by this impossibility, and compensating them 
accordingly. Since the amount owed each individual for Future Expected Wrongness is 
calculated to infinity, each possesses an infinite amount of Victim Credit, that is, an amount 
equal to everyone else’s. Once the economy was placed on the firm footing of universal guilt 
and infinite indebtedness, such that everyone was owed compensation by everyone else in an 
amount equal to that which they owed, society was able to achieve equality and freedom by 




(Hon.) Aikaterine Akenehi, 
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